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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
William E. Clark appeals from his convictions 0n two counts of felony unlawful

entry,

arguing that the evidence was insufﬁcient t0 support those convictions.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Ofﬁcers investigating a report of a robbery in progress detained William E. Clark as part

0f that investigation.

(R.,

pp.15-17 (Afﬁdavit of Probable Cause).)

The ofﬁcers learned

Clark had an outstanding arrest warrant and attempted to arrest him, but Clark ﬂed.

17.)

He

then entered two

homes without

(R.,

that

pp.15-

the consent of their owners or occupants while trying to

evade ofﬁcers before he was captured and arrested.

(R., pp.15-17.)

two counts 0f felony unlawful entry under Idaho Code

The

state

§ 18-7034(2), resisting

charged Clark with

and obstructing an

ofﬁcer, and providing false information. (R., pp.23-26.) Clark pled not-guilty. (R., p.28.)

Clark requested a bench

trial.

Grangeville City Police Ofﬁcer Phillip
that people

were

Morgan Drew
p.21, L.1

1

The ﬁle

—

in his

also responded to the

The evidence

Graham responded

home robbing him.

p.22, L.11.)

titled

(R., pp.38-39.)

same

(Tr. Vol.

call

II,

t0 a call

p.67, L.21

at trial established that

from Lenny Kelso reporting

— p.69,

L.13.1) Chief of Police

of a possible robbery in progress.

(Tr. V01.

II,

Videos from Chief Drew’s and Ofﬁcer Graham’s body-cams were

“Appeal Volume

1-

Transcripts” contains two separately paginated volumes.

The

— 16 0f

from pages 1
the entire ﬁle, contains the transcript 0f the hearing at Which the
district court announced its verdict on the two unlawﬁll entry charges. The second, contained at
pages 17 — 154 of the entire ﬁle, contains the transcript of a hearing on Clark’s motion for a
ﬁrst,

bench trial, the transcript 0f the one-day trial, and the
Following Clark (Appellant’s brief, p.2 n.1), the state will
the latter as “Tr. Vol. II.”

transcript 0f the sentencing hearing.
refer to the former as “Tr. V01. I”

and

introduced at

trial

1

and

Ofﬁcer Graham arrived

p.84, Ls.7-20.)

individuals, a

as State’s Exhibits

man and

woman,

a

Mr. Kelso was not home.

respectively? (Tr. V01.

2,

State’s EX. 2, 01 :30

Kenneth Denning.

—

men

and instructed two

trailer

The two Who were

02:00.)

(Tr. V01.

II,

p.22, L.12

— p.24,

Denning placed what Chief Drew recognized
parked in front of the
(though the Video

Denning
trailer,

t0 set

it

is

trailer.

(Tr. Vol.

obscured, Chief

car out front, and Clark and

telling

p.39, L.14;

in the trailer

were

L.9; p.70, L.10

as an air pistol

p.22, L.12
stated, “I

Drew

Ofﬁcer Graham

—

(Tr. V01.

inside t0 exit.

—

—

left his trailer,

later

hope

that

01:35.) Chief Drew

to the

p.70, Ls.10-16;

II,

identiﬁed as Clark and

p.71, L9.)

As he

exited,

Mr.

on the trunk 0f one of the vehicles
1,

00:00 — 00:13

air pistol”

and instructed

p.24, L.9; State’s EX.

(State’s EX. 2, 02:15

he locked the door when he

them money.

II,

—

two outside while Ofﬁcer Graham went

that’s

down).) Mr. Kelso then arrived and, after Ofﬁcer

spoke With Ofﬁcer Graham.

stated that

woman

p.70, Ls.10-16; State’s EX. 2, 01 :00

II,

arrived very shortly thereafter and stayed with the

open door 0f the

p.38, L.23

Mr. Kelso’s mobile home ﬁrst and observed two

at

standing outside, With the

(Tr. V01.

II,

an

Graham ﬁnished

— 02:35, 03:50 —

when he

clearing the

04:43.)

returned the door

Mr. Kelso

was open with a

Denning had been threatening him the night before because he owed

(State’s EX. 2, 03:50

—

04:43.)

Ofﬁcer Graham spoke with Clark and frisked him for weapons without discovering any.
(Tr. V01.

II,

p.70, L.17

—

p.71,

with Mr. Deming, Chief

2

State’s Exhibit

1,

L9;

State’s EX. 2, 06:47

Drew asked

Clark’s

the Video from Chief

—

name and

08:30.)

As Ofﬁcer Graham

then spoke

date of birth, and radioed dispatch for a

Drew’s body—cam, is in the record in a ﬁle titled
2, the Video from Ofﬁcer Graham’s body—cam, is in

“E._C1ark_Foot_Pursuit” and State’s Exhibit

the record in a ﬁle titled "William_C1ark_-_Foot_Pursuit.”

records check. (Tr. V01.

Drew

II,

p.24, L.15 —p.25, L.2; State’s EX.

radioed dispatch with Clark’s

full

06:38 — 8:00.)

1,

When

Chief

name, Ofﬁcer Graham heard the name and recalled

having been told by a superior ofﬁcer roughly a week earlier that Clark was wanted on a felony
warrant and presented a safety

risk.

(Tr. V01.

p.70, L.25

II,

Chief Drew that there was conﬁdential information
stepped

away from

(Tr. V01.

Clark.

indications that Clark might run.

0n,” Ofﬁcer

Graham

L.18.) Dispatch responded t0

side-to-side,

(Tr. Vol.

II,

told Clark t0 turn around

which point Chief Drew

to convey, at

p.28, Ls.7-13; State’s EX.

II,

Graham saw Clark “looking from

— p.75,

1,

legs,”

stretching his

When

p.78, Ls.4-22.)

09:00 — 09:37.)

Which he Viewed

1,

and put his hands behind

09:38 — 09:50; State’s EX.

informed Chief Drew of the warrant.

(Tr. V01.

Ofﬁcer Graham and Chief Drew

II,

p.80, L.1

— p.81,

II,

said that the police

p.52, L.6

— p.54,

her father’s

L.20.)

trailer,

A

copy 0f an

When

next door.

outside and told Ofﬁcer

3

were

— p.30,

his

after

(Tr. V01.

him
II,

instructed

When

—

Clark,

p.54, L.21

him

p.91,

L.9.)

t0 stop, but lost sight

15:35.)

Who

—

p.55,

The

of him

resident ofthe trailer

she did not know, entered her

call the police.

(Tr. Vol.

II,

watched him walk towards

L22.) Hearing police, she went

that she suspected Clark

had gone

11,

malicious harassment charge was later admitted as State’s Exhibit

L.14 — p.94,

— p.79,

2018, served on Clark by Ofﬁcer Graham
issue here, and issued in association With a felony

November

events at

p.78, L.23

L.2.3)

t0 leave her trailer, she

Graham what had just happened and

jail after the

II,

Just before he ﬂed, dispatch

him, and begged her not t0

she forced

back because he had

of Clark. After several minutes 0f searching,

L.8; State’s EX. 2, 15:24

arrest warrant dated

while Clark was in

p.29, L.1

11:23

trailer,

Clark exited, Shareena Bentley, had been asleep

trailer,

11:40.)

lost sight

Ofﬁcer Graham observed Clark come out of a
again. (Tr. V01.

—

2,

as

Clark asked, “what’s going

a warrant and reached for Clark’s arm, at Which point Clark ﬂed. (Tr. V01.
L.25; State’s EX.

Ofﬁcer

3.

(Exs., pp.1-5; Tr., V01.

II,

into her father’s trailer.

2,

—

16:22

(Tr. V01.

second

16:45.)

(Tr. Vol.

Ofﬁcers

p.81, L.22

II,

trailer,

—

II,

p.54, L.21

later pulled

—

L22;

p.55,

Clark from under a bed in the

observed Clark being removed from the

trailer

entry charges, his counsel argued that a defendant

18-7034(2) only

§

and engage

The
resisting

if the

peace ofﬁcer

in conduct suspected

district court

and

or authority to enter. (Tr. Vol.

Clark did not testify and submitted n0 evidence.

Code

(Tr.

trailer

is

— p. 128, L28), but

stated that Clark

“literally

(Tr. V01.

—

p.125, L.3

II,

was

At a subsequent hearing,

unlawful entry charges as well.

Clark to eight months 0f
concurrently.

(R.,

jail

at least guilty

the court

and arrested him.

p.62, L. 14

(Tr. V01.

I,

— p.64,

t0 the felony

not

L.19.)

unlawﬁll

II,

p.1 16, L.8

— p.1 19,

false information

p.127, L.4.)

L.24.)

and guilty 0f

The court deferred a
(Tr. V01.

II,

p.127,

of misdemeanor unlawful entry, which
(Tr. Vol.

II,

p.124, L.8

— p.125,

L.2;

announced a guilty verdict 0n the two felony

p.6, L.7

—

p.7, L.4.)

The

district court

sentenced

time on each of the unlawful entry charges, to be served

pp.51-57; Tr. V01.

II,

p.152, Ls.2-17.)

obstructing and resisting charge 0n the state’s motion.

(R., pp.64-67.)

State’s EX.

observed” the defendant commit a felony

Clark asked the court to consider as a lesser included offense
p.127, Ls.7-10).

1;

“pursued” by a peace ofﬁcer under Idaho

of constituting a felony.

V01.

II,

determination 0n the unlawful entry charges t0 conduct additional research

L.4

L.1

later testiﬁed that she did

With respect

found Clark not-guilty 0f providing

and obstructing.

— p.81,

Ms. Bentley’s step—mother, one 0f the residents of the

p.82, L.16.)

know him and he had no permission

p.80, L.17

The court dismissed
(R., pp.59-61.)

the

misdemeanor

Clark timely appealed.

IS SUE

Clark states the issue on appeal

Did

the district court err

as:

by ﬁnding Mr. Clark

guilty of unlawful entry during fresh

pursuit because the ofﬁcers’ pursuit of Mr. Clark to execute an arrest warrant does

not qualify as “fresh pursuit” as deﬁned by LC. § 19-705?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Clark failed t0 show that there was insufﬁcient evidence
on two counts 0f felony unlawful entry?

verdict

to sustain the district court’s guilty

ARGUMENT
Clark Has Not

A.

Convictions

On Two

Introduction

When
him

Shown That The Evidence Was Insufﬁcient T0 Sustain His
Counts Of Violating Idaho Code S 18-7034(2)

ofﬁcers investigating Clark’s involvement in a reported robbery attempted t0 arrest

after learning

he had an outstanding felony warrant, Clark ﬂed 0n

foot,

the ofﬁcers

immediately and persistently chased him, and Clark attempted to hide by entering two homes
Without permission. After a bench

trial,

the district court correctly found that Clark

two counts of felony unlawful entry under Idaho Code

§

18-7034(2).

On

was

guilty of

appeal, Clark does not

dispute any of those facts, but argues that the convictions should be reversed because, though he

was running and hiding from ofﬁcers Who were attempting

to detain

him on suspicion of

committing a felony, he was not being “pursued” by the ofﬁcers as that term

Code

§

18-7034(2).

According

to Clark, while

being “pursued” by them under Idaho Code
to execute a felony warrant

the statute.

and “pursuit

§

is

being pursued on foot by ofﬁcers he was not

18-7034(2) because the ofﬁcers were pursuing him

to execute a warrant”

does not constitute “pursuit” under

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) That argument fails for two reasons. First,

it is

the plain language of the statute, contrary t0 the policy considerations motivating

case law, and has absurd results.

evidence before the

B.

Standard

district court

used in Idaho

it,

contrary to

contrary t0

Second, even accepting Clark’s interpretation of the statue, the

was more than sufﬁcient

to

afﬁrm these convictions.

Of Review

Appellate review of the sufﬁciency of the evidence

158 Idaho 542, 545, 348 P.3d 157, 160 (2015).

is

limited in scope.

State V. Eliasen,

“In assessing the sufﬁciency 0f evidence, [this

Court] will uphold a judgment 0f conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there

is

substantial evidence

proved

all essential

upon Which a

rational trier

of

fact

could conclude that the prosecution

elements 0f the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

V. Jones,

154 Idaho

The Court “must View

412, 417, 299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013) (internal quotation omitted).

evidence in the light most favorable” to upholding the jury verdict and Will not substitute

judgment on issues of weight,

credibility 0r reasonable inferences.

the trial evidence, including the evidence offered

its

Li The Court reviews

by the defendant.”

the

own

“all

of

State V. Cortez, 135 Idaho

561, 563, 21 P.3d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 2001). If there are multiple possible bases for supporting a
general verdict, “the inquiry on appeal

any one of the bases 0f conviction.”

becomes whether

Li. at 564,

the evidence, “this Court Will construe

all

is

305

at 501.

t0

uphold

In reviewing the sufﬁciency of

(Ct.

App. 2003).

a legal question that the Court reviews de novo.

Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (201

C.

was sufﬁcient evidence

of the evidence in favor 0f upholding the verdict.”

State V. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818, 87 P.3d 302,

Statutory interpretation

21 P.3d

there

m

1).

Even Accepting Clark’s Interpretation Of Idaho Code SS 18-7034(2) And 19-705, The
Evidence Is Sufﬁcient To Sustain Clark’s Convictions
At

issue

7034(2), which

0n appeal are Clark’s convictions 0n two counts 0f Violating Idaho Code

makes

it

§ 18-

a felony for any person t0 enter “any permanent or temporary dwelling

Without the consent of the owner 0f such property or his agent or any person in lawful possession
thereof While being pursued

by a peace ofﬁcer.” LC.

§ 18-7034(2).4

Clark does not deny that the

evidence was sufﬁcient to show that he entered two permanent or temporary dwellings without
appropriate consent, or that Ofﬁcer

4

Graham and Chief Drew

Idaho Code § 18-70340) makes the same conduct

misdemeanor.

When

are peace ofﬁcers.

The only

issue

not being pursued by a peace ofﬁcer a

on appeal
term

is

Whether the evidence was sufﬁcient

used in Idaho Code

is

§

18-7034(2),

t0

show

when he

that

he was “pursued” by them, as that

entered those dwellings.

(E

generally

Appellant’s brief.)

Idaho Code § 18-7034(2) provides that “[f]or purpose 0f this subsection ‘pursued’ means
‘fresh pursuit’ as

deﬁned

Uniform Act on Fresh

in section 19-705, Idaho

committed a felony or who

even

The
if

Idaho Code § 19-705—part 0f the

Pursuit, Title 19, Chapter 7 0f the Idaho

include “fresh pursuit as deﬁned by the

705.

Code.”

is

common

Code—deﬁnes

law, and also the pursuit 0f a person

reasonably suspected of having committed a felony.”

statute speciﬁes that a

person

may be

Li.

was

“pursued” for purposes of Idaho Code § 18—7034(2)

“fresh pursuit” under the

common

has

I.C. § 19-

is

reasonable ground for

Finally, fresh pursuit does “not necessarily

imply instant pursuit, but pursuit Without unreasonable delay.”
is

Who

reasonably suspected 0f committing a felony

“no felony has actually been committed,” so long as “there

believing that a felony has been committed.”

person

“fresh pursuit” to

law, 0r (2) the person

Li.

if

Thus, as Clark recognizes, a

and only

if either (1) the pursuit

was pursued having committed a

felony or if they are reasonably suspected of having committed a felony. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

According

to Clark, pursuit to execute a felony arrest warrant

condition because, where an arrest warrant has issued, the pursuit

from the criminal
pursuit.

act 0r the conduct suspected

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.)

is

does not meet either

too temporally separated

of constituting a criminal act to constitute fresh

According to Clark, the pursuit must be “instantaneous

0r reasonably prompt” in relation to the conduct constituting the felony or that

is

suspected of

constituting a felony. (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

As

discussed below, Clark

705, and so

is

is

mistaken regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code

mistaken regarding the application of Idaho Code

§

18-7034(2).

The

§ 19-

clear,

unambiguous terms 0f the former

statute

imply

suspect that the defendant committed a felony

pursuit initiated t0 execute that warrant

But

this

Court need not address that issue

Code

regarding the interpretation 0f Idaho

is

may be

to believe 0r

the existence of an outstanding felony warrant,

pursuit for purposes of Idaho

at all

§

even Where the only reason

that,

Code

§ 18-7034(2).

because, even assuming that Clark

is

correct

19-705, the evidence below established that the

ofﬁcers were in fresh pursuit of him.5

The uncontroverted evidence

Graham and Chief 0f
(Tr. V01.

residence.

II,

(Tr. Vol.

The owner 0f

home

the

locked, he returned t0

after

that,

—

—

it

they encountered Clark, Ofﬁcer

t0 a report

p.69, L.13; p.21, L.1

—

of an active robbery 0f a

p.22, L.11.)

Clark and another

were found inside the home, the owner 0f Which was not

p.24, L.9; p.70, L.10

—

then arrived and told Ofﬁcer

ﬁnd

When

p.71, L.9; State’s EX. 2, 01:00

Graham

that

he

left his

home.

The

02:00).)

door closed and

him

(State’s EX. 2,

Ofﬁcer Graham then reported ﬁnding “fresh pry marks” 0n the door 0f the

(State’s EX.

state

—

open, and Clark and his compatriot were inside trying to rob

having threatened him the previous night because he owed them money.

03:50 — 04:43.)

5

air pistol,

p.22, L.12

II,

showed

Drew were responding

p.67, L.21

armed With an

individual,

there.

Police

at trial

1,

03:28 — 03:44; State’s EX.

2,

05:10 — 05:32.)

understands Clark t0 be arguing that there

is

not “fresh pursuit” under Idaho

Code

§ 19-705 Where an ofﬁcer pursues a person for the sole purpose 0f executing an arrest warrant,
and not to be arguing that the mere fact that an ofﬁcer is aware of an outstanding arrest warrant

always implies that there was no fresh pursuit.

For example, where an ofﬁcer

is

execute an arrest warrant and, in the process 0f doing so, the suspect shoots and
ofﬁcer, the subsequent pursuit 0f the suspect

is

705 even

if,

any claim

that pursuit

kills

The

somehow
under Idaho Code § 19-

arrest warrant

0f a person was “fresh pursuit”

does not

contrary t0 fact, pursuit of the subject only t0 execute the warrant

constitute fresh pursuit.

another

clearly “fresh pursuit” notwithstanding the

ofﬁcer’s knowledge of an outstanding arrest warrant.
unilaterally defeat

attempting to

would not

Ofﬁcer Graham and Chief Drew testiﬁed
part in a reported robbery

L4.)

when he

ﬂed.

that they

(Tr. Vol.

II,

were actively investigating Clark’s

p.33, L.18

—

p.34, L.6; p.82, L.17

—

p.83,

Clark was clearly detained as part of that investigation, as he was one of two central

and was given orders regarding Where

his hands,

What he

could and could not pick up, and was required to submit to a frisk for weapons after

initially

suspects,

resisting

Ofﬁcer Graham’s attempt

08:27; State’s EX.

1,

Where he could place

t0 stand,

to conduct such a frisk. (State’s EX. 2, 01 :40

—

02:00, 05:45

—

00:00 — 03:24, 05:00 — 08:20.) That detention was lawful only because the

ofﬁcers suspected Clark of breaking into a home, committing a robbery, and/or attempting to

commit a robbery.
(“An

State V. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614,

investigative detention

is

permissible if

it is

(Ct.

App. 2014)

based upon speciﬁc articulable facts Which

justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person

criminal activity”).

329 P.3d 391, 396

is,

has been, or

is

about t0 be engaged in

In light of the facts available t0 the ofﬁcers discussed in the previous

paragraph, their suspicion

was

reasonable.

“Although

it

must be more than a mere hunch, the

level of suspicion required to create a reasonable suspicion is less than is necessary for probable

cause and considerably less than proof by a preponderance 0f the evidence.” State

Idaho 299, 305, 336 P.3d 232, 238 (2014).

V.

Russo, 157

The ofﬁcers here had more than enough reason

to

suspect Clark 0f robbery, attempted robbery, or burglary, and were in the process 0f investigating

those suspicions

when Clark ﬂed and

they pursued him.

Even assuming

that “fresh pursuit”

requires that the pursuit be in close temporal proximity to the conduct constituting 0r that

suspected 0f constituting a felony, that condition

is

met

here.

warrant aside entirely, the ofﬁcers were in fresh pursuit 0f Clark

Though Clark was not charged
that

fact

is

irrelevant

is

Setting the outstanding felony

When he

ﬂed.

in this case With robbery, attempted robbery, 0r burglary,

under Idaho Code

§

19-705.

10

The question

is

whether Clark was

“reasonably suspected 0f having committed a felony”

at the

time he was pursued, not whether

any felony “has actually been committed” 0r even whether he was charged. LC.

when arguing below

likewise irrelevant that,

that Clark

§ 19-705.

was pursued under Idaho Code

It is

§ 18-

7034(2), the prosecutor focused 0n the outstanding felony warrant and the ofﬁcers’ attempt to

arrest

him 0n

that warrant.

that Clark entered the

(Tr. V01.

II,

p.1

1 1,

L.11

—

homes while being pursued by a peace

precisely Clark counted as “pursued” under Idaho

district court

p.1 14, L.1 1.)

Code

“[A] general verdict

is

is

§ 18-7034(2).

(R., pp.23-26.)

making any ﬁndings

(Tr. V01.

I,

p.5, L.13

—

why
The

as t0

why

p.7,

L4.)

not reversible Where one 0f the possible bases of conviction was

unsupported by sufﬁcient evidence.”
before this Court

ofﬁcer, Without specify

18-7034(2).

§

issued what amounted to a general verdict, without

Clark counted as “pursued” under Idaho Code

The information alleged only

m,

whether, Viewing

all

favorable to upholding the conviction, there

135 Idaho

at

564, 21 P.3d at 501.

of the evidence and Viewing

was sufﬁcient evidence

it

The question

in the light

to support

most

“any one 0f the

bases of conviction.” Li. Whether or not the state emphasized in closing that Clark was pursued

under Idaho Code
robbery,

§

18-7034(2) because ofﬁcers reasonably suspected that he was involved in a

attempted robbery,

conviction on this basis.

was sufﬁcient
to

make

0r burglary,

the

evidence was

sufﬁcient to

support Clark’s

Sufﬁciency of the evidence review focuses 0n whether the evidence

to establish the elements

0f the offense, not on the argument the prosecutor chose

in closing.

For similar reasons, Clark was pursued under Idaho Code

committed the offense 0f resisting and obstructing ofﬁcers

§

18-7034(2) because he

in their presence

and then ﬂed When

they pursued him. Whether he was arrested for an outstanding felony warrant 0r was ﬂeeing an

ongoing investigation into a reported robbery, Clark resisted and obstructed ofﬁcers by ignoring

11

commands and running from them.

their

The

L.4.)

there

convicted

district court

was insufﬁcient evidence

to

(Tr. V01.

him of that
do

II,

—

II,

p.126, Ls.1-6.)

offense in the presence 0f the ofﬁcers, they had authority t0 arrest

under the

common law and by

(2019) (holding that the

statute.

603(1).

Likewise,

when

fresh pursuit under the

him Without

law.

p.83,

that

a warrant, both

446 P.3d 451, 456

warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed in

misdemeanors outside 0f the ofﬁcer’s presence); LC.

the ofﬁcers pursued Clark, his continued ﬂight from

common

—

Having committed

State V. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 398,

common law permits

the ofﬁcer’s presence, though not for

p.34, L.6; p.82, L.21

offense and Clark does not argue on appeal that

(Tr. V01.

so.

p.33, L.18

In State V. Scott, 150 Idaho 123,

2010), the Court 0f Appeals discussed fresh pursuit under the

them

constituted

244 P.3d 622

common

§ 19-

(Ct.

App.

law, looking to the

following factors:

Whether the police acted Without unnecessary delay; (2) Whether the pursuit
was continuous and uninterrupted, even if surveillance or knowledge of the
(1)

was interrupted; and (3) Whether a close temporal relationship
between the commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit,

suspect’s location

existed

and the apprehension 0f the suspect.
Li. at 125,

pursuit

244 P.3d

at 624.

When he observed

Considering those factors, the court held that an ofﬁcer was in fresh

a trafﬁc Violation and followed the vehicle outside of his jurisdiction to

effectuate a trafﬁc stop, investigate the Violation,

and issue a trafﬁc

citation.

Li

at 126,

244 P.3d

at 625.

The ofﬁcers here observed Clark
potential crime,

free

and

resist

and obstruct a lawful

from Ofﬁcer Graham, ignored

their

and obstruct

resist

arrest

their lawful investigation into a

on an outstanding warrant, when he broke

commands, and

ran.

ﬂ

State V. Orr, 157 Idaho 206,

210-12, 335 P.3d 51, 55-57 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that refusal to comply With lawful orders
during a criminal investigation justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion constitutes resisting and
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obstructing).

pursuit

the

(R.,

They pursued and

was continuous and

that offense Without unnecessary delay, the

uninterrupted, and there

was a

commission of the offense, the commencement of the

close temporal relationship between

pursuit,

and the apprehension 0f Clark.

pp.15-16 (afﬁdavit of probable cause, noting that Clark was arrested for resisting and

obstructing ofﬁcers).)

§

him 0n

arrested

19-705

When he

The ofﬁcers were

in

common law

fresh pursuit of Clark under Idaho

homes because they were pursuing him

entered the two

offense 0f resisting and obstructing an ofﬁcer, in Violation of Idaho

presence.6

§

The

fact that the offense is a

misdemeanor, not a felony,

19-701A, part 0f the Uniform Act 0n Fresh Pursuit, authorizes

arrests in certain cases, including

Code

Where the ofﬁcer

is

§

he committed the

18-705, while in their

irrelevant.

Idaho Code

extra—territorial but intrastate

in fresh pursuit

is

after

Code

0f a person

who

“has

committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense or trafﬁc infraction” in the presence of

an ofﬁcer.

misdemeanor

The provision makes
in the presence

clear that the pursuit of a person

of the pursuing ofﬁcer

may be

153 Md. App. 83, 86, 835 A.2d 187, 189 (2003) (“The

fresh pursuit.

common law

Who

E

has committed a

alﬂ

Seip V. State,

doctrine of fresh pursuit

allows an ofﬁcer t0 pursue and arrest a person outside 0f the ofﬁcer’s jurisdiction, Without a
warrant, for misdemeanors committed in the ofﬁcer’s presence Within a reasonable time after

commission 0f the

crime.”); People V.

hot pursuit of misdemeanor

6

DUI

Wear, 893 N.E.2d 63 1, 645-46

subject

who

(Ill.

2008) (ofﬁcers were in

disobeyed commands to remain 0n scene and ﬂed,

Idaho Code § 18—705 provides, “Every person

Who

wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any

public ofﬁcer, in the discharge, or attempt t0 discharge, of any duty of his ofﬁce or

knowingly gives a

false report t0

any peace ofﬁcer, When no other punishment

is

who

prescribed,

is

punishable by a ﬁne not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one (1) year.”
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permitting ofﬁcers to enter

home and make

arrest

Without a warrant);

App. 209, 210, 294 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1982) (warrantless entry

Where defendant

t0

Brown

V. State,

163 Ga.

house justiﬁed by hot pursuit

resisted ofﬁcer’s lawﬁJI attempt to investigate trafﬁc Violations

by ﬂeeing,

thereby resisting and obstructing an ofﬁcer).7
Setting aside whether pursuit for the sole purpose 0f executing an arrest warrant

Code

pursuit under Idaho

§

they reasonably suspected

conducting

when he

19-705, the ofﬁcers here were in fresh pursuit 0f Clark both because

him 0f

a felony associated With the criminal investigation they were

ﬂed, and because he resisted and obstructed both that investigation and his

0n the outstanding warrant by ﬂeeing. The evidence

arrest

convictions under Idaho

Code

§

is

sufﬁcient t0 support Clark’s

18-7034(2) on both of those bases and Clark does not argue

otherwise. This Court should therefore

7

fresh

is

afﬁrm those convictions.

“Fresh pursuit” and “hot pursuit” are largely interchangeable.

E m,

150 Idaho at 125, 244
from other jurisdictions discussing both “fresh” and “hot” pursuit to
support the same common-law analysis of “fresh pursuit”); Johnson V. United States, 333 U.S. 10
n.7 (1948) (in discussing argument that police were in “hot pursuit,” discussing Washington’s
version 0f the Uniform Law on Fresh Pursuit); Hot Pursuit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1 1th ed.
2019) (referring t0 the deﬁnition of ‘Fresh Pursuit”). Hot 0r fresh pursuit may justify the arrest of
a suspect outside 0f the ofﬁcer’s jurisdiction, as provided in the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, or
P.3d

at

624

(citing cases

the warrantless entry t0 premises the entry t0

Brown and
People

V.

M.

E

Which would otherwise require a warrant,

also State V. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 922, 155 P.3d 1157, 1161 (2007);

Escudero, 592 P.2d 3 12, 318 (Cal. 1979) (“[F]resh pursuit of a ﬂeeing suspect

committed a grave offense and remains dangerous

to life

and limb

circumstances’ sufﬁcient to justify a search Without a warrant”).
the latter authority

is

as in

restricted to the fresh pursuit

may

Even

who

has

constitute ‘exceptional

in jurisdictions in

which

of persons reasonably believed to have

committed a felony, ofﬁcers are n0 less in “fresh pursuit” 0f persons Who have committed
misdemeanors in their presence, even if that pursuit Will not justify warrantless entry t0 a home.
Here, 0f course, there is no warrantless entry t0 a home at issue.
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The Clear And Unambiguous Terms Of Idaho Code

D.

Person T0 Execute

An Arrest Warrant May Constitute

S

19-705

Impr

That Pursuit

Of A

“Fresh Pursuit”

Clark does not argue that there was insufﬁcient evidence that there was an outstanding
felony warrant against

him

0r insufﬁcient evidence that Ofﬁcer

when

reasonably believed that there was

they were pursuing him.

Graham and Chief Drew

He

argues only that, as a

categorical matter, such pursuit cannot constitute “fresh pursuit” under Idaho

because the conduct constituting the felony, or that
felony,

is

too temporally distant from the pursuit.

the Court t0 read into Idaho

clear,

Code

unambiguous terms of the

may be

§

is

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-21.) Clark

Code

their plain, usual,

Whole. If the statute
as written.”

Verska

is

19-705

not in the statute.

home

is

asking

Under

the

arrest warrant

during such pursuit

may be

a

§ 18-7034(2).

Statutory interpretation “must begin with the literal

must be given

is

0f a person to execute a felony

“fresh pursuit,” and so the non-consensual entry 0f a

felony under Idaho

§

reasonably suspected of constituting a

19-705 a requirement that

statute, pursuit

Code

words of the

and ordinary meaning; and the

statute

not ambiguous, this Court does not construe

V. Saint

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

it,

statute; those

words

must be construed

as a

but simply follows the law

151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506

(2011) (quoting State V. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations

This Court has “consistently held that Where statutory language

omitted».

legislative history

unambiguous,

and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering

the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”

Q,

is

Li. (quoting City

of Sun Valley

V.

Sun Valley

123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).

As
person

discussed above, Idaho

Who

Code

§

has committed a felony or

19-705 deﬁnes “fresh pursuit” to include “pursuit of a

who

is

15

reasonably suspected of having committed a

LC.

felony.”

§ 19-705.

To “pursue”

homes.

is

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

The ofﬁcers here were obviously pursuing Clark When he entered

to “follow in order to overtake, capture, kill or defeat,” 0r t0 “chase.”

ONLINE

webster.com/dictionary/pursuing

DICTIONARY (11th
hunt”). Ofﬁcer

ed.

DICTIONARY,
(last Visited

June

available

1,

E

2020).

https://www.merriam-

at

alﬂ

BLACK’S

Pursue,

ofﬁcers, were following and chasing Clark

and seize him While he ﬂed and entered two homes.

otherwise, but disputes whether there

him of having “committed

is

a felony.”

Clark does not argue

sufﬁcient evidence that the ofﬁcers reasonably suspected

(Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-13.)

But even

setting aside the

robbery, burglary, 0r attempted robbery they were investigating, they obviously did.

just learned that Clark

warrant

may be

was

the subject 0f an outstanding felony arrest warrant.

I.C.R. 4(a).

named 0n

the warrant has committed

1164

App. 2005). Knowledge

cause t0 believe as much.

Who

has 0r

is

it.”

State V.

arrest warrant constitutes a judicial

been committed and that the individual

Reﬂa, 142 Idaho

624, 626, 130 P.3d 1162,

named

in the warrant

committed a felony, but probable

Therefore, pursuit to execute a felony arrest warrant

is

pursuit 0f a

is

“clear and

reasonably suspected of having committed a felony.

Against that common-sense conclusion, Clark argues that the statute

unambiguous”

felony arrest

that a felony arrest warrant is outstanding provides not only

reasonable suspicion that the person

person

“The issuance 0f an

that probable cause exists to suspect a crime has

(Ct.

A

They had

issued only based 0n a ﬁnding 0f probable cause that the subject of the warrant

has committed a felony.

ﬁnding

LAW

2019) (“To follow persistently in order t0 seize or obtain; to chase or

Graham and Chief Drew, both peace

in order to capture

the

that

6“

committed a felony’ means present commission only” (Appellant’s

p.1 1), that is “the ofﬁcer’s observation or

brief,

knowledge of the suspect’s nearly contemporaneous

commission of a suspected felony” (Appellant’s

brief, p.13).
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It

requires pursuit of

someone who

“just

committed a crime” 0r

is

reasonably suspected having just committed a crime, not pursuit to

execute a warrant based on a “past offense.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

Nothing in the

statute

supports that View.

T0 support

his View, Clark points ﬁrst t0 the

that “the

word “committed,” arguing

reference t0 a person ‘who has committed’ a suspected felony plainly denotes a present action or

perpetration of the offense.”

means an
comes

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)

action that has just occurred 0r

is

Assuming by “present

action” he

“near contemporaneous” (Appellant’s brief, p.13), he

to that conclusion after citing dictionary deﬁnitions that

do not support

According

it.

to

Clark:

The

legislature did not include fresh pursuit

0f a person “charged” With or

“convicted” of a felony. “Committed” denotes the act
criminal proceedings. Black’s

Law

itself, before the start 0f
Dictionary deﬁnes “commit” as “to perpetrate

(a crime)” Commit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Similarly,
Merriam-Webster’s deﬁnes “commit” as “to carry into action: perpetrate,” and
Webster’s deﬁnes it as “do, perform.” THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 144

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 457
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
Commit,

(2016);

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commit
deliberately: perpetrate”) (last Visited

A

felony committed a

month ago

is

Mar.

(“to

(2002); see also
available

carry

into

17, 2020).

just as “perpetrated,” “carried into action,” “done,”

“performed” as a felony committed ﬁve minutes ago.

None of

It

is

later 0r

if the

conduct

absurd t0 suggest, as Clark apparently does, that a person “has

committed” a felony ﬁve minutes

weeks

and

those deﬁnitions suggests a

requirement that a person “has committed” a felony by certain conduct only
occurred just now.

at

action

after the relevant conduct, but has not

committed a felony two

because an arrest warrant issued.

Second, Clark notes that the statute provides that an ofﬁcer need only “reasonably
suspect” that the person pursued has committed a felony, not that a felony has actually been
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committed. (Appellant’s

an

brief, p. 12.)

arrest warrant because, if

an arrest warrant was pending, the ofﬁcer would have more than

reasonable suspicion 0f a felony.”

because the statute

that

Where reasonable

“This language must signify pursuit before the issuance 0f

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

sets a ﬂoor,

Clark’s argument, apparently,

nothing that exceeds that ﬂoor could satisfy the

suspicion of a felony

obviously meets the requirements of the

That an ofﬁcer

statute.

may have

a higher degree of

justiﬁed conﬁdence in particular circumstances, a degree of conﬁdence above that ﬂoor,

nothing

at all

about the interpretation 0f the

statute.

the ofﬁcer’s reasonable suspicion 0f the offense

It is

it is

tells

us

not true that “[t]he statute’s language on

would be rendered superﬂuous

could engage in fresh pursuit to execute an arrest warrant.” (Appellant’s
in a statute articulating a requirement is not

statute.

more than reasonable suspicion of a felony

required,

is

is

if

an ofﬁcer

brief, p.17.)

Language

“superﬂuous” because the requirement articulated in

met and exceeded.
Third, Clark points to the requirement that the pursuit be “Without unreasonable delay,”

even

if

it

does not have to be “instant.” (Appellant’s

brief,

p.12 (quoting LC. § 19-705).)

Clark

argues that “this language must signify pursuit before the issuance of a warrant—the very nature

of an outstanding warrant means there Will always be delay prior to the execution of that
warrant.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

timeframe of pursuit to shortly

“The requirement of prompt pursuit plainly

after

the

suspect’s

actual

limits the

commission of the offense.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

The language he

What

cites

does not “plainly

limit[] the

the statute and the fresh pursuit doctrine prohibit

pursuit, but “unreasonable delay.”

It is

is

timeframe 0f pursuit” in that way.

not delay in initiating and continuing

not “unreasonable delay” in a pursuit When, as here, the

ofﬁcer began the pursuit as soon as he identiﬁed the suspect as the subject of an outstanding
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felony warrant and as soon as the suspect ﬂed.

221 (1981)

(in discussing rule that

E, gg, Steagald V. United States, 45

1

U.S. 204,

ofﬁcers generally need a search warrant to enter a third-

party’s residence to effectuate an arrest warrant, noting that the burden of the rule

enforcement

is

mitigated in part because “a warrantless entry 0f a

home would be justiﬁed

police were in hot pursuit of a fugitive” (internal quotation omitted»; State V.

48, 53-54 (Kan. 2005) (holding that hot pursuit doctrine applies

as subject 0f arrest warrant

and subject ﬂees When ofﬁcers

A.2d 1043, 1048 (NJ. 1995) (holding

that ofﬁcer

was

try to

on law
if the

Thomas, 124 P.3d

where ofﬁcers recognize suspect

make

arrest); State V. Jones,

in hot pursuit

667

0f defendant, permitting

warrantless entry to third-party’s residence, Where he recognized defendant as the subject 0f an

outstanding warrant, attempted t0 arrest on the warrant, and suspect ﬂed);

N.E.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Mass. 1993) (holding

that ofﬁcer

authorizing arrest outside of the ofﬁcer’s jurisdiction,

was

when he

Com.

V.

Owens, 609

in fresh pursuit

of subject,

learned that suspect had an

outstanding arrest warrant and gave immediate and continuous pursuit); United States V. Willis,

443

F.

App’x 806, 808

(4th

Cir.

201

1)

(where defendant with outstanding felony and

misdemeanor warrants ﬂed from ofﬁcers and entered

third-party’s apartment, hot pursuit doctrine

applied to permit ofﬁcers to enter apartment Without a warrant); Carr V. Runnels, No.

PJH

(PR), 2007

WL

ineffective for ﬁling

warrantless entry t0

133971,

motion

at

t0 suppress

no good reason

been no fresh
that

because

home was justiﬁed by

trying to execute arrest warrant).

for

*10 (ND. Cal. Jan.

after learning that

pursuit.

E

would have determined

that

Where defendant ﬂed When ofﬁcers were

had discontinued or delayed the pursuit 0f Clark

he had an outstanding felony warrant, there would have

United States

where ofﬁcer attempted

03-1369

2007) (holding that counsel was not

district court likely

fresh pursuit

If the ofﬁcers

16,

C

V.

Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding

t0 effectuate arrest

19

0n outstanding warrants and suspect ﬂed, hot

pursuit doctrine did not apply because the ofﬁcer discontinued the chase for at least half an hour).

But the ofﬁcers here could not have pursued Clark more quickly and

diligently than they in fact

did and Clark does not argue otherwise.

The

clear,

unambiguous terms of Idaho Code

§

19-705 imply that pursuit t0 execute an

outstanding felony arrest warrant

may

0n appeal

as a categorical matter, never fresh pursuit

this

is

that such pursuit

is,

constitute fresh pursuit.

Because Clark’s only argument
under that

statute,

Court should reject his argument and afﬁrm his convictions for Violating Idaho Code

§ 18-

7034(2).

Idaho Code S 19-705 Is Ambiguous, This Court Should Interpret The Statute
Providing That Pursuit T0 Execute
Felony Arrest Warrant May Be Fresh Pursuit

E.

If

As

A

The

plain language of Idaho

provides that a suspect

statute,

this

may be

Where the ofﬁcers

Code §§ 18-7034(2) and 19-705

“pursued” by law enforcement, as that term

ambiguity from Idaho Code § 19-705,
is

and unambiguously

is

used in the former

are chasing the ﬂeeing suspect to effectuate an arrest warrant.

Court determines that Idaho Code § 18-7034(2)

Doing so

clearly

it

is

But

if

ambiguous, including by inheriting some

should interpret the statutes t0 reach the same

required t0 effectuate the purposes 0f those statutes, to ensure consistency

result.

among

other sections of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, to avoid absurd results, and to be consistent

With other courts t0 have considered the question.

Where

a statute’s words “are subject t0

Court must construe the statute
that intent,

[this

‘to

mean what

more than one meaning,
the legislature intended

Court] examine[s] not only the

literal

it

it is

to

words of the

ambiguous and

mean. To determine
statute,

reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and
history.”’

Ada

Ctv.

Highway

Dist. V.

Brooke View,

20

Inc.,

this

but also the

its

legislative

162 Idaho 138, 142, 395 P.3d 357, 361

(2017) (quoting

A

Doe

V.

BOV

Scouts 0f America, 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)).

“fundamental principle of statutory construction”

is

that “the

meaning 0f a word cannot be

determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in Which

m,

508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). Courts “follow the cardinal rule

whole” because “the meaning of statutory language, plain or
St.

not,

used.” Deal V. United

that a statute is to

be read as a

depends on context.” K_ingi

Vincent’s Hosp, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).

The public

policies

interpretations according to

from ofﬁcers attempting
statute,

behind both Idaho Code §§

to execute that warrant

may

and 19-705 support

18-7034(2)

which pursuit 0f the subject of a felony

arrest

warrant

who

is

ﬂeeing

constitute fresh pursuit under the latter

and so pursuit under the former.
Beginning ﬁrst with Idaho Code

existing

offender

18-7034(2), that sub-section

§

misdemeanor unlawﬁll entry provision
is

A

they are chasing

him

t0 execute

Rules Committee, the

bill’s

suspect ﬂeeing from police

sponsor identiﬁed

home

in

at

t0 the

no

25234, S.B. 1093,

less

ﬂeeing because

its

purpose as punishing and deterring the

S.B. 1093, S. Jud.

00:58 — 04:06 (Idaho Mar.

Administration Committee, the

when

a suspect ﬂeeing from

an attempt t0 avoid detention by police, concluding that that

risk 0f harm warrants a felony charge.

Reg. Sess.,

2017

committed While the

RS No.
is

in

an arrest warrant. In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary and

imposition 0f the inherent and serious risks of harm t0 citizens

police unlawfully enters a

was added

to “raise[] unlawful entries

ﬂeeing from the police t0 a felony.” Statement 0f Purpose,

64th Leg., lst Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017).

&

it is

bill’s

1,

& Rules Comm.

2017). In a hearing before the

Audio, 64th Leg.,

House

Judiciary, Rules

sponsor again emphasized the purpose of the

associated With the risk of harm t0 citizens

When

a suspect unlawfully enters a

lst

home

bill as

While being

“pursued” by police, explaining “that means they’re running from police actively.” S.B. 1093, H.

21

Jud., Rules,

The

2017).

from police

& Admin. Comm. Video, 64th Leg.,
risk

is

lst

Reg. Sess.,

at

00:49 — 02:55 (Idaho Mar. 21,

of harm t0 citizens when a suspect unlawfully enters a dwelling while ﬂeeing

precisely the

same Whether the suspect

is

being pursued because 0f a felony just

committed 0r suspected 0f having been committed 0r because the police are attempting
execute a felony arrest warrant.
section, for the imposition

It

sense,

and compromises the purpose of the sub-

of the same risk of harm t0 be penalized differently, as a felony in the

former case and misdemeanor in the
Clark argues that

makes no

to

latter.

same

this

legislative history supports

his View, pointing t0

two

questions during the hearings cited above. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18—20.) Those questions d0 not

support Clark’s position. During the hearing before the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee, a
senator asked the bill’s sponsor whether “having a warrant out for one’s arrest

considered to be being pursued by law enforcement?” S.B. 1093,

64th Leg, lst Reg. Sess.,

at

not and that “being pursued

Rules

Comm.

12:38

is

House

(Idaho Mar.

1st

Reg. Sess.,

Judiciary, Rules

12:50

at

&

bill’s

2017).

The response was

that

it

would

sponsor responded that

it

—

13:15 (Idaho Mar.

1,

2017).

&

During

Administration Committee, a senator asked a

similar question: whether “pursuit” of the suspect

Which the

1,

& Rules Comm. Audio,

not the same as being sought” 0r “wanted.” S.B. 1093, S. Jud.

Audio, 64th Leg,

the hearing before the

— 12:50

S. Jud.

would be

would have

would have

t0

to constitute “hot pursuit,” to

be hot pursuit, would require “actually

being chased,” and that merely “a warrant being out there” 0r “some kind 0f investigation” would
not qualify.

10:33

—

S.B. 1093, H. Jud., Rules,

11:35 (Idaho Mar. 21, 2017).

&

Admin. Comm. Video, 64th Leg,

lst

Reg. Sess.,

at

Clark claims that these responses demonstrate that “the

sponsoring senator informed both the senate and the house that ‘pursued’ would not include

22

warrants,” Which the subsequently included cross—reference to Idaho

Code

§

What

the sponsoring

19-705 was

allegedly intended to codify. (Appellant’s brief, p.20.)

That argument misrepresents the cited portions 0f the hearings.
senator

was asked

in the Senate Judiciary

warrant out for one’s arrest would

sponsor responded that
the

House

it

would

Judiciary, Rules

was not sufﬁcient
being chased.”

to

He

itself

not, that

and Rules Committee was Whether merely having a

be sufﬁcient t0 constitute being pursued.

& Administration Committee, the bill’s

be pursued that “a warrant

[is]

sponsor again clariﬁed that

is

was not intended

to

mean

“hot pursuit.”

constitute pursuit,

it

is

no

“hot pursuit.” Police

an

arrest warrant.

may

dispute.

From

does not follow that

What

actually chasing a suspect t0 execute a warrant does not constitute pursuit.

that the suspect

This

be sufﬁcient for pursuit for

something about which there

mere existence of a warrant does not

is

it

out there,” the suspect must be “actually

further clariﬁed that he intended “pursuit” t0

purposes of Idaho Code § 18-7034(2). That

sponsor emphasized

bill’s

being “wanted” was different than being “pursued.” In

suggests only that the mere existence 0f a warrant

the fact that the

The

the bill’s

must be “actually being chased” and police must be

in

actually chase a suspect and be in hot pursuit in an attempt t0 execute

The subsequently included cross—reference

t0 Idaho

Code

§

incorporates the requirement that pursuit be “fresh” or “hot” pursuit, even if

19-705 merely

it

is

pursuit to

execute a warrant.

Next, both the purpose and function of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, which includes
the deﬁnition of “fresh pursuit” in Idaho

correctly notes, the

Commission”).
the uniform act

Code

§ 19-705, likewise cut against Clark.

Act was drafted and proposed by the

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)

on fresh pursuit

is

Interstate

According

to prevent criminals

23

t0 the

from

As Clark

Commission on Crime

(“the

Commission, “The purpose 0f

utilizing state lines to

handicap our

THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION 0N CRIME, THE HANDBOOK 0N

police in their apprehension.”

INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL

(4th

ed.

1942)

at

https://hd1.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015028062191.
out 0f his jurisdiction

is,

“in general,

16,

available at HathiTrust Digital Library,

Because an ofﬁcer who crosses

no longer an ofﬁcer” and

is

state lines

therefore Without authority t0

arrest, criminals

and suspected criminals could potentially escape apprehension by ﬂeeing across

state lines.

The Act attempted

state to

Li.

make

arrests in the adopting state

discussed, ofﬁcers could already

the

common

law. Li. at 20.

adoption of the Act that the

make an

t0 resolve the

common law

boundary and make an

was

common

doctrine, also based

arrest in fresh pursuit”).

According

how

its

how much

“chasing”

while in fresh pursuit under

proposed

(“this

Li.

common law

while adding a uniform fresh pursuit

is

of “fresh pursuit” in Idaho Code
involved, no matter

When

how

19-705 excludes

§

fast-paced the chase, and no

learning the suspects identity and

to

make an

Who ﬂees

while being pursued by police attempting t0 execute an arrest warrant

handicap our police in their apprehension” in exactly the

intended to prevent.

arrest in

It

statute,

(See also Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (“the Act would

urgently 0r diligently the ofﬁcers acted

state lines to

may

[ofﬁcers] of their right t0 cross a state

location—if police are attempting to effectuate an arrest warrant. But a criminal
state lines

Commission

t0 apply t0 all states”).)

to Clark, the deﬁnition

pursuit—no matter
matter

on the common law,

the

doctrine that ofﬁcers in fresh pursuit 0f a criminal

would inform

preserve each state’s fresh pursuit under

As

common law and clarify through

t0 codify the

effective in the adopting state.

law,

Li

in fresh pursuit.

arrests across state lines

The Act was intended

arrest across state lines

While declaratory of the

make such

when

problem by authorizing ofﬁcers from out—of—

contravenes the purpose of the Act to interpret

such circumstances.

24

it

way

is

that the

across

“utilizing

Act was

as prohibiting an ofﬁcer

Moreover, the Commission was clear that the Act was intended t0 constitute an adoption

common

0f the

law, under which pursuit for purposes 0f executing an arrest warrant

constitute fresh pursuit.

ofﬁcer

may

jurisdiction

“Under the common law doctrine of fresh

may

pursuit, or ‘hot pursuit,’

an

pursue a felon 0r a suspected felon, with 0r without a warrant, into another

and

arrest the suspect there.”

5

Am.

Jur.

2d Arrest

52 (updated

§

(emphasis added) (going on to discuss the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit).
courts routinely apply the fresh pursuit doctrine

Where a suspect

attempting to execute an existing arrest warrant.

(E

DLiling, 12 P.2d 735, 736 (Kan. 1932) (“The result

is,

has been delivered for service

may

is

As

2020)

discussed above,

m

ﬂeeing from an ofﬁcer

E

s_um, pp.18-19.)

a constable t0

May

Whom

alﬂ

a warrant of arrest

not g0 beyond the conﬁnes of his county t0

make

the arrest,

except in what amounts to fresh pursuit”); Porter V. State, 765 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

2000) (“Under the

common law

doctrine of fresh pursuit, an ofﬁcer

may

pursue a felon or a

suspected felon, With 0r Without a warrant, into another jurisdiction and arrest
Feathers V. State, 611 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1980) (“At

common

him them”);

S_ix

law, a law enforcement ofﬁcer

could arrest a felon or a suspected felon with 0r Without a warrant in another jurisdiction only

he were in fresh pursuit of the felon 0r suspected felon”); People

V.

if

Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 156

(Colo. 1983) (“[A] peace ofﬁcer seeking to effectuate an arrest in a jurisdiction other than the

one employing such ofﬁcer must, absent fresh pursuit, obtain assistance from local ofﬁcers with
appropriate arresting authority”);

(holding that where ofﬁcer

Com.

became aware

that suspect

Which suspect crossed out of the ofﬁcer’s
arrest

under fresh pursuit doctrine); State

(holding that defendant

was improperly

Owens, 609 N.E.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Mass. 1993)

V.

was

the subject 0f a felony warrant, after

jurisdiction, the ofﬁcer could follow

V.

De

arrested

25

Grote, 347

on an

and make an

A.2d 23, 25 (NJ. Law. Div. 1975)

out-of—state warrant

under

New

Jersey’s

version of the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, but only because the warrant

misdemeanor and not a

felony).

doctrine

When an ofﬁcer

an

inapplicable

is

was

for a

Clark has not cited a single case holding that the fresh pursuit

is

chasing a ﬂeeing suspect While attempting to execute

arrest warrant.

Clark argues that because a warrant issued in one state generally has no validity outside of
that state, the

limitation.”

“remedy”
existing,

Act would have speciﬁed

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

that jurisdictional limitation.

common law

But the Act was

What

the

are being pursued

is

n0 reason

remedy

this jurisdictional

not, as a general matter, intended t0

to

do

is

codify and apply the

from avoiding otherwise lawﬁJI

extra—territorial detentions authorized

whom

0n those warrants, while others

of “fresh pursuit” applies and there

t0

Act was intended

Some of the

state lines.

fresh pursuit doctrine will involve suspects for

Who

was “intended

it

fresh pursuit doctrine t0 prohibit criminals

by ﬂeeing over

detentions

if

arrest warrants

the

have already issued and

Will not. In each case, the

that the deﬁnition

by

same deﬁnition

would incorporate a reference

to warrants in particular.

Next, Clark argues that Idaho Code § 19-701A supports his proposed interpretation of
“fresh pursuit.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.)

make

ofﬁcers in fresh pursuit to

According

t0 Clark,

it

warrant, While Idaho

pursuit t0

make

arrests

That provision governs the authority of in-state

in Idaho but outside

supports his position because

Code

arrests in

§

it

includes speciﬁc mention of arrests 0n a

19-701—governing the authority 0f

Idaho—does

of their local jurisdictions.

out-of-state ofﬁcers in fresh

not. Clark claims:

This means that the legislature understood, and rightfully so, that the authority t0
pursue for a warrant was not included in the existing deﬁnition of ‘fresh pursuit.’

The

legislature

found

it

necessary t0 add a speciﬁc provision t0 allow for an Idaho

ofﬁcer’s pursuit t0 execute a warrant within the

26

state.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.)

Contrary to Clark’s argument, the provision does not support his

position, but cuts directly against

it.

Idaho Code

§

19-701A provides

Any peace oﬁicer 0f this state in fresh pursuit 0f a person
believed by him to have committed a felony in this state or

in relevant part that:

[1]

Who

[2]

has committed, or

is

reasonably

attempted t0 commit, any criminal offense 0r trafﬁc infraction in this state in the
presence 0f such ofﬁcer, or

[3]

for

whom

a warrant ofarrest

is

outstandingfor a

criminal oﬂense, shall have authority t0 pursue, arrest and hold in custody or cite

such person anywhere in

LC.

§

this state.

19-701A (emphasis added).

On

the

View advocated by Clark—that,

as a matter 0f the

deﬁnition of “fresh pursuit,” pursuit 0f an individual because they are wanted on a warrant

never fresh pursuit—the emphasized portion 0f the statute

is

rendered a complete

nullity.

is

There

could never be fresh pursuit of a person solely because a warrant of arrest against that person

is

outstanding for a criminal offense, and so there Will simply never be a case in which an ofﬁcer

is

in fresh pursuit

of a person for

Whom

a warrant 0f arrest

is

outstanding for a criminal offense.

Idaho Code § 19-701A, which employs the term “fresh pursuit” as deﬁned in Idaho Code § 19705, clearly contemplates that pursuit t0 effectuate a warrant
Finally, Clark’s position

would have absurd

may be

fresh pursuit.

results, contrary t0 the public policy

both Idaho Code § 18-7034(2) and the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.

Clark

is

behind

advocating for

“an interpretation 0f ‘fresh pursuit’ that requires an ofﬁcer’s prompt pursuit upon the present

commission 0f a suspected felony.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

According

“suspected felony” must involve a “present action 0r perpetration of the offense”

brief, pp.1 1-12),

offense”

and the pursuit must occur “shortly

(Appellant’s brief, p.12).

Clark, the

(Appellant’s

commission of the

Fresh pursuit must be based 0n the “ofﬁcer’s instantaneous

0r reasonably prompt pursuit 0f a suspect

suspect’s nearly contemporaneous

after the suspect’s actual

to

upon

the ofﬁcer’s observation or

commission of a suspected felony.”

27

knowledge of the

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

Clark’s View has absurd results. In addition t0 the absurdity 0f supposing that the subject

0f an

arrest

warrant can avoid police actively chasing him by jumping over state lines or entering

a third-party’s home, Clark’s View implies that the fresh pursuit doctrine can simply never apply

where the relevant crime was not “nearly contemporaneous” With the chase.
investigation, for example, if an ofﬁcer investigates the crime for a

month and

In a

murder

a witness suddenly

and unexpected confesses but then immediately ﬂees, the ofﬁcer’s pursuit apparently cannot
constitute “fresh pursuit” because

it

was not

“shortly after” the

home

Clark’s View, if the suspect unlawfully enters a

not a Violation 0f Idaho

Code

§ 18-7034(2),

and

commission of the offense. In

while ﬂeeing from the ofﬁcer, doing so

if the suspect

ﬂees across

state lines, the

cannot follow and effectuate an arrest under the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. That
result with

is

is

ofﬁcer

an absurd

no possible justiﬁcation.

If the

Court determines there

is

some

relevant ambiguity in Idaho

Code

§ 18-7034(2), the

Court should reject Clark’s argument that a suspect cannot be “pursued” under that sub-section

where the ofﬁcer

is

attempting to execute an outstanding felony arrest warrant.

The Court Reverses Clark’s Convictions For Felony Unlawful
For The Entry Of Misdemeanor Unlawful Entry Convictions
If

F.

Below, Clark’s counsel asked the

district court t0

unlawful entry convictions under Idaho Code

II,

—

p.124, L.8

p.125, L.2.)

The

p. 5, L.

I,

ﬁnding

which

that

is

22 —

p. 6, L. 1.)

It

Should Remand

consider the entry of misdemeanor

18-7034(1) as lesser-included offenses. (Tr. V01.

§

district court

then held that there was undoubtedly sufﬁcient

evidence t0 support misdemeanor convictions for unlawful entry.
V01.

Entry,

(Tr. V01.

II,

p. 128, Ls. 2-5;

Clark argues that there was insufﬁcient evidence t0 support the

he was “pursued by a peace ofﬁcer” Within the meaning 0f Idaho Code

the ﬁnding necessary to enhance the

misdemeanor

28

to a felony.

LC.

§

18-7034(2),

§ 18-7034.

Thus,

district court’s

Clark does not contest the

conclusion that he

misdemeanor unlawful entry under Idaho Code

guilty 0f

is at least

§ 18-7034(1).

Where an

two counts 0f

appellant establishes

insufﬁciency 0f the evidence as to an element exclusive to a greater offense, Without challenge
the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence as t0 any 0f the elements 0f a lesser-included offense, the

appropriate

remedy

to reverse the conviction

is

judgment on the lesser-included offense.

ﬂ

on the greater offense and

direct entry

State V. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 704,

1338, 1344 (Ct. App. 1997) (after concluding that evidence 0f value 0f

of

946 P.2d

damaged property was

insufﬁcient to support conviction for felony malicious injury to property, holding that conviction

“must be reduced

t0 a

misdemeanor” because the jury’s

guilty verdict

0n the felony offense

necessarily constituted a ﬁnding that each element 0f the lesser-included offense

beyond a reasonable doubt);

State V. Sprouse, 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d

was

established

378 (1941) (reducing

ﬁrst-

degree murder conviction t0 voluntary manslaughter Where evidence was insufﬁcient t0 establish

“malice aforethought,” the only element distinguishing the two offenses); State

V.

Haggard, 89

Idaho 217, 231-32, 404 P.2d 580, 588-89 (1965) (where only sufﬁciency 0f the evidence
challenge

was

vacating

ﬁrst-degree

t0

element distinguishing ﬁrst and second degree burglary, the time 0f the crime,
burglary

conviction

and directing entry of second-degree burglary

conviction); United States V. Skipper, 74 F.3d 608,

612 (5th

Cir.

1996) (where evidence was

insufﬁcient to support conviction for greater offense 0f possession with intent to distribute,

remanding With direction

to enter

“the jury necessarily found

this

all

judgment

as t0 lesser offense 0f simple possession because

of the elements 0f simple possession in rendering

Court accepts Clark’s argument and vacates his felony convictions,

entry 0f judgment 0n

it

its

29

If

should remand for

two counts 0f misdemeanor unlawful entry because the

necessarily, and, in fact, explicitly, found that the elements of

verdict”).

district court

misdemeanor unlawful entry were

established

beyond a reasonable doubt and Clark challenges only the sufﬁciency 0f the evidence

as to the element enhancing that offense to a felony.

CONCLUSION
The

state

respectfully requests this

unlawful entry under Idaho Code

Court t0 afﬁrm Clark’s convictions for felony

§ 18-7034(2).
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